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minority party. As a result, we hypothesize that changes in House rules are likely to occur when the balance of forces on the floor changes, even if the majority party caucus median remains unchanged. We maintain that the majority party can credibly threaten to punish its dissidents precisely when the party least needs to do so: when it has a substantial majority and is relatively unified. Otherwise, the risks to the majority party of punishing dissidents are likely to counterbalance any benefits gained through creation of a reputation for refusing to tolerate defectors. We believe party procedural control therefore varies considerably over time, and is dependent upon the size of the party majority and its homogeneity (Rohde 1991; Binder 1996) . 1 We also argue that party procedural control varies significantly in scope, depending upon the nature of matters under consideration. Caucus dissidents are far more reluctant to carry their opposition to the floor with respect to personnel matters (the election of the speaker and of committees) than with respect to other important organizational matters, such as the design of committee jurisdictions. Voting against party personnel constitutes more than a threat to House organization; it is an act of open disrespect for public symbols of the party that is difficult for the majority leadership to tolerate. When we turn our attention to the conditions under which members are punished, we find that opposition to the party's presidential candidate is the action most likely to result in party sanctions against a member. This supports the notion that members' test of party standing has more to do with respect for party symbols than with upholding party logrolls embedded in House structures. I Our evaluation of these competing perspectives is based on two sorts of evidence: first, we examine House decision-making during the past 75 years concerning central House rules. Second, we examine efforts to sanction members of the majority party for disloyal behavior. We attempt to identify the ramifications of defecting on key rules votes during the period. Cox and McCubbins (1994) make it clear that the realm of partisan procedural control encompasses the selection of House officers and committees, the design of the committee system, and the structure of agenda power more generally (e.g., the determination of committee jurisdictions, and specification of the agenda-setting powers of the Speaker, legislative committees, and Rules Committee). Together, these features of House organization are said to entrench a set of logrolls beneficial to the majority party (1994; 220-1).
Parties and House Organization
1In our usage, party procedural control means that the majority party is at a minimum able to block changes that a majority of its members oppose, and at best is able to force changes that its members support.
To evaluate this claim, we consider procedural politics for the period 1919-94. We choose 1919 as our starting point because it allows us to test whether Democratic party troubles during the 1940s-60s were a product of a regional stalemate that constituted an aberration in an otherwise strong record of party procedural control, or were representative of long imperfect party procedural governance. 
Electing Officers
The evidence on the elections of the Speaker and committees poses the fewest problems for Cox and McCubbins' model. This should not be surprising, given that skeptics of partisan strength have long argued that parties hold together for the election of officers and committees, and then become far less influential (Young 1958, 57, 61) . Our investigation of the election of the Speaker in each Congress since 1919 finds that threats by majority party members to defeat the majority caucus nominee have been rare. In December 1923, a group of roughly 20 progressive Republicans refused to vote for the party nominee for Speaker, Frederick Gillett (R-MA), on the first nine ballots. The insurgents provided Gillett with the votes he needed to be elected only after party leaders agreed to allow them a reasonable opportunity to alter key House rules (Congressional Record, December 5, 1923, 14) .
Since that time, there have been occasional rumors of dissident factions in the majority party flirting with minority leaders to defeat the majority party nominee for Speaker (Manley 1973, 243-4; Moser 1979 , 51-3). Nothing has come of these rumors, although one of the more interesting tests of the seriousness of such a possibility was averted when the Democrats, rather than simply losing seats to the Republicans in 1994, also lost their majority status.3 Nonetheless, it is intriguing to note that in 1989, cross-party coalitions rebelled against majority party control and elected the Speaker of the 20ur choice of dates excludes two noteworthy cases of rules changes in the twentieth century: the changes forced by the insurgent-Democratic coalition in 1909-10 over the objections of the Republican majority, and the rules revision of 1911 put forward by the new Democratic majority. The latter passed on a party-line vote; but the rules changes were an amalgam of partisan changes and concessions to reformers (Hasbrouck 1927, 11-3, 38-9, 145) . 3Television commentator Jeff Greenfield reported rumors in Capitol Hill circles of a possible alliance between a handful of conservative Democrats and the GOP, if the Republicans had found themselves 10 seats short of a majority (see Political Hotline, November 1, 1994).
House in the state legislatures of Connecticut and North Carolina, two states with traditions of strong legislative parties.4 Developments in these states sent a signal that majority party leaders in other legislatures must at least be cognizant of the potential for cross-party coalitions to take control.
The election of House committees and selection of committee leaders also appears to be under relatively firm partisan control.5 As Rohde (1994) points out, the floor has never overturned party decisions on committee assignments. Threats to vote against caucus nominees have been few and far between, and both major "parties have shown a delicacy about interfering with each other's committee nominations" (Hasbrouck 1927, 44 5Majority party control over selection of party members on committees does not necessarily imply that committee composition is biased toward the majority party median and away from the floor median (Krehbiel 1993) . 6Party control over personnel matters has been challenged only in unusual circumstances. For example, in 1981, the Democrats wanted to strip Pennsylvania's Eugene Atkinson of his committee assignments when he became a Republican. To do this would have required floor approval, and Democratic leaders were uncertain whether southern conservatives would go along with the move in the current political atmosphere. Atkinson held onto his assignments as a Democrat for the rest of the Congress, even though he had repudiated his ties to the party (CQ Almanac 1981, 11). To prevent such occurrences in the future, the Democrats amended the rules in 1983 to make continued assignment to committees contingent upon being a member of the party caucus granting the assignment (CQ Almanac 1983, 596-7).
The Committee System and Agenda Power Party control over the design of the committee system and of rules concerning agenda power has been considerably more tenuous than has party control over personnel matters. As is the case with personnel selections, we find several instances in which the majority party has been divided in the caucus. Unlike the election of the Speaker and of the committees, however, these disagreements have tended to carry over to the floor, undermining the party's procedural control.
As suggested above, Cox and McCubbins (1994, 223) predict that shifts in the position of the caucus majority are necessary preconditions for changes in important elements of legislative organization. Our alternative perspective holds that changes in the floor median absent changes in the position of the caucus majority are often sufficient to result in rules changes. It is only in recent years, as the threat of majority party punishment for defectors has increased, that the majority party has become capable of blocking rules changes even in the face of a potentially opposing floor majority. But this threat of punishment is precarious; in the presence of a narrow floor majority or a divided party, it recedes significantly.
One natural focus for an investigation of control over these elements of House structure is the beginning of each Congress when the House must adopt a set of rules. The chairman of the Rules Committee typically moves that the House adopt the rules of the previous Congress, at times with specific amendments. This is the only time during the session that a simple majority can amend the rules, absent the cooperation of the Rules Committee, recourse to the discharge process, or the willingness to override several valid points of order. Therefore, it is at the beginning of each new Congress that procedural control by the majority party is most critical. Cox and McCubbins (1994, 221) observe that "the vote on adoption of the House rules is taken immediately after election of a speaker and before committee assignments are handed out. At least on initial adoption there seem to be ample incentives for majority party members to support the rules proposed by their party, and empirically the majority party almost always does stick together on the bulk of the standing rules."
To begin to test this claim, Table 1 presents a list and brief description of all roll calls taken on the initial adoption of rules from 1919 to 1993. The table includes the cohesion of each party on the roll call, as well as the outcome. Figure 1 graphs majority party cohesion on these initial rules-adoption votes.
The data suggest first that, since the mid-1970s, majority party success on rules-adoption votes has been considerable. The Democrats used these votes to put through rules changes that were vehemently opposed by the Third, in the 10 sessions opening with contested rules changes from 1919 to 1970, the majority party was triumphant in only six of the sessions. An examination of the specific cases involved reveals that important rules changes affecting agenda control have on several occasions followed shifts in the floor median in the absence of changes in the party median.
To structure our analysis, we have divided the rules changes into three substantive domains: the discharge process, the powers of the Rules Committee, and committee jurisdictions more generally. These three areas encompass the bulk of the efforts to change rules that appear to fit Cox and McCubbins' category of "key structural matters" pertaining to agenda control.9
Discharge Process
The discharge process was a center of controversy between party leaders and cross-party coalitions for much of the first 40 years of this century. Following Republican losses in the 1922 elections, the Democrats held a sufficient number of seats to constitute a majority should they unite with progressive Republican members. At the opening of the new Congress in January 1924, progressive Republicans joined the Democrats to force through a series of rules changes, including a reduction in the number of members required to support the discharge of a committee from 218 to 150. This change challenged agenda control by the majority party and the standing committees (Beth 1994) , and was opposed by 78% of the Republicans voting. At the next 8In most of these 16 cases, the Congressional Record reveals no evidence of controversy during floor debate on the rules. 90ur discussion also includes those rules changes affecting the areas in question that were adopted at times other than the opening of a new Congress. election, the 1924 Coolidge landslide gave the regular Republicans a sufficient floor.majority to control the next Congress without the help of the progressive Republicans' votes. As a result, the regulars in 1925 reversed the 1924 rules changes and rendered the discharge process ineffective. Dissident Republicans cast 22 votes against the rules changes, but this left them several votes short of the number needed to preserve the rule.
The Democrats continued to call for a liberalization of the discharge process while in the minority. When the party gained a slim majority in 1931, they had their opportunity to implement such a change, reducing the number of members required to support bill discharges from committees from 218 to 145. This rules change passed on a near-perfect partisan vote, yet it is unclear that liberalizing the discharge process was done in order to facilitate majority party priorities. After all, as the majority party, the Democrats would presumably be the ones threatened by discharge petitions (given that they controlled the committee system, as is assumed in the Cox and McCubbins formulation). It is better to view the 1931 change as part of an effort to maintain consistency in positions: the Democrats, having advocated a rules change to benefit the minority party while in the minority, were unable to switch sides on the issue quickly once they were in the majority.
By 1933, Democratic leaders came to believe that the party needed to return to the requirement for 218 signatures on discharge petitions. The Democrats now had a large, unruly majority, and leaders were concerned that members would use the discharge process to force ill-advised bills to the floor that benefited special interests while undermining the general Democratic recovery program (Washington Post, April 13, 1933). Despite a clear majority of the caucus favoring the rule change, a large number of Democrats promised to fight the move on the floor. Facing the prospect of an embarrassing floor defeat, party leaders deferred action until 1935, when the once-more increased Democratic majority led to a renewed effort to restrict the discharge process. Before the opening of the new Congress, the Democratic caucus voted 225-60 to make the rule change a binding party position (Washington Post, January 3, 1935). The change then passed on the floor by a 245 to 170 vote. Seventy-two Democrats defected on the critical procedural vote shutting out amendments to the rules package, and 70 defected on the vote on final passage of the rule change. Thus, although the party leaders were successful, the force of the so-called "binding" vote is difficult to judge.
As the "conservative coalition" of Republicans and southern Democrats gained control of several critical committees in the late-1930s, some mainstream Democrats sought a liberalized discharge rule as a mechanism to pry party programs loose from recalcitrant committees (see for example, Congressional Record, January 3, 1939, 13-4). Party leaders successfully re-sisted such efforts, believing that a liberalized discharge rule held the danger of disrupting the House agenda too seriously to be a well-tailored tool to challenge the growing conservative ascendancy. Still, the calls by liberal Democrats to ease the discharge rule underscore the extent to which a strong faction within the Democratic party believed that the party lacked effective control over the proposal behavior of House committees.
Beyond these occasional liberal demands, one finds no serious effort to alter the discharge rule until 1993.10 The 1993 change makes public the names of representatives who sign discharge petitions, thus undermining party leaders' ability to discourage members from signing petitions for politically popular proposals opposed by the majority Democrats. Republican James Inhofe's (R-OK) success in amending the rule was rooted in his ability to use the media to raise the visibility of the issue. Democratic leaders, sensing an impending defeat, dropped their pleas for members to fight Inhofe's proposal, and reluctantly accepted this minority party-forced change (CQ Almanac 1993, 10).
To sum up, rules surrounding the discharge process were changed twice following changes in the balance of power on the floor absent changes in the majority party (1924, 1925 In 1963, the rules were amended to make permanent the increase in the size of the Rules Committee initially approved in 1961. On the initial procedural vote to shut off further amendments, the Democrats prevailed easily with only seven defectors. On the vote on adoption of the new rules, the Democrats again prevailed, although this time with 48 defectors. The vote on the first motion, with its mere seven dissidents, is one of the first indications in the data we have explored of numerous majority party members apparently voting against their policy preferences in order to follow the majority of their fellow partisans. 14 The Democrats gained a much greater degree of control of the Rules Committee during the 1970s. Particularly important was the Democratic caucus rule adopted in 1975 granting the Speaker the power to appoint majority party members to the Committee. There is little doubt that majority party members on the Rules Committee now have strong incentives to be responsive to party leaders. It should also be noted that since shortly after the 1910 enlargement of Rules, the majority party has maintained an advantageous party ratio on the Committee.15 The crucial point, however, is that in spite of a favorable majority party ratio, Republicans and dissident Democrats enjoyed a working majority on the Committee throughout the 1937-61 period (Rohde 1991, 98) , and the Democratic leadership did not gain unequivocal control of Rules until the 1970s. 13Observers estimated that Rayburn had between two and five pocket votes ready should he have needed them (MacKaye 1963). Still, even with the pocket votes, the outcome was extremely close.
'4One reason for the low number of defectors on the previous question motion was that the vote shut out a package of "fair-play" proposals that the Republicans were planning to offer, which included such provisions as increased minority staffing.
15This ratio was increased from 2-1 to 11-5 in 1975.
The evidence on rules changes pertaining to the Rules Committee therefore offers only limited support for the hypothesis of majority party control. Important changes were made in 1951 and 1967 despite clear majority party opposition to change. It also appears that most Republicans opposed changes adopted in January 1924 restricting the powers of the Rules Committee chairman (Hasbrouck 1927 ). The majority party succeeded in altering the Committee in 1949, 1961, and 1965, but the latter two triumphs were dependent on minority party support, and the 1949 and 1965 changes were reversed two years later by cross-party coalitions. Not until caucus changes in the 1970s did the majority party finally gain firm control of the Committee.
Committee Jurisdictions
Turning to changes in committee jurisdictions, one finds surprisingly few cases of either party using the adoption of rules at the start of the session to put forward changes. Nevertheless, important changes have been considered and, on occasion, approved in the past 75 years. Jurisdiction changes are of three types: formal rule changes, changes based on bill-referral precedents, and alterations based on more-or-less formal understandings among committee leaders (Evans and Oleszek 1995). King (1992 King ( , 1994 argues convincingly that bill-referral precedents have been a major instrument of jurisdiction change, and that this process has been largely nonpartisan since the institutionalization of the parliamentarian's office in the years following the overthrow of Speaker Cannon.
To supplement King's analysis of precedent-based changes, we attempt to identify every case in which the jurisdiction of a committee was altered through a rule change from 1919 to 1993. We rely primarily on the House Rules Manual, which is published with each new Congress. We use the versions of the Manual for the 65th Congress (1917-19) (Wander 1984) . Even in the case of Hansen, Democrats were so deeply split that reform advocates made several concessions to Republicans to attract needed votes (Sheppard 1985) .
The reason that partisan coalitions have put through few major revisions in committee jurisdictions may be that membership on committees creates crosscutting cleavages that are viewed as a legitimate basis for opposing party leaders. Unlike assignments of members to committees, the determination of committee jurisdictions appears to be a matter that is with rare exceptions left to the membership as a whole rather than restricted to the majority party caucus.
Even the Republican-designed changes to committee jurisdictions adopted in 1995 were limited by fear of trouble on the floor. David Dreier (R-CA) devised an ambitious plan to reshape jurisdictions to correspond to Republican priorities. But the Republican leadership dramatically scaled back the proposal due to fear that the Dreier plan would "endanger unanimous Republican support for the opening day reforms, and potentially complicate timely passage of the Contract with America" (Evans and Oleszek 1995, 17). The Republicans did eliminate three minor committees with primarily Democratic constituencies; however, few other changes to jurisdictions were adopted. Evans and Oleszek argue that the fierce divisions in the Republican caucus surrounding the committee changes paralleled the Democrats' earlier experiences with jurisdiction reform, and seriously limited leaders' ability to reshape the committee system in a partisan direction. They conclude that "in the House Republican experience with jurisdictional change, constituency interests and the personal power stakes of key legislators dominated partisan motivations" (Evans and Oleszek 1995, 21).
Our evidence on jurisdictions challenges the view that the committee system is designed to protect majority party logrolls. Clearly, committee jurisdictions have been shaped through more party-centered processes in recent years than in the past. It is hard to imagine in 1995 that a major revision in committee jurisdictions could be adopted that was essentially proposed by a member of the minority party, as was the case with the Legislative Reorga- Education and Labor has long been notorious for having its products taken apart on the floor (Fenno 1973; Mayhew 1974) . Although labor influence on the committee probably prevented some antilabor legislation over the years, it also must be acknowledged that labor has never achieved its goals of reversing restrictions in Taft-Hartley (1947) and Landrum-Griffin (1959).
We conclude from our examination of House rules that decisions surrounding the discharge process and Rules Committee have been only incidentally party-based. They have been fundamentally ideological, and can be represented on a single underlying dimension for much of the period under consideration. Conservative Republicans opposed Democrats and progressive Republicans in the 1920s, while liberal Democrats opposed conservative Democrats and their Republican allies for much of the 1940s-60s. As the balance among these coalitions shifted, so (in general) did the relevant rules. Increased Democratic homogeneity in the 1970s and 1980s, however, allowed the majority party to gain control over the Rules Committee to a degree that appears to be less susceptible to changes in the coalitional balance on the floor. A second type of rules change has been more consistently partisan: Democrats have been quite united when it comes to depriving Republicans of committee staff and opportunities to offer dilatory motions (see Table 1 ). A third type of rule change, involving committee jurisdictions, has tended to be less partisan than either of the first two categories. The distribution of committee turf involves multiple, crosscutting evaluative dimensions for members. Only rarely has the majority party been sufficiently strong to dominate the cross-party cleavages in this realm.
Punishing Defectors
Our investigation of changes in House organization reveals that the majority party has enjoyed consistent control of the election of the Speaker and committee assignments, but that partisan control of key House rules has been far more tenuous, particularly prior to the mid-1970s. The weakness of partisan control over rules in the 1919-70 period might relate to limitations in the majority party's ability to punish defectors on rules votes during this period. Cox and McCubbins (1994) argue that majority party control over rules is safeguarded by a party's ability to sanction defectors on key procedural votes. They write that "the Democratic caucus has made a very public commitment to expel (or discipline) members who fail to support the features of House structure that undergird the party's logrolling abilities" (1994, 224). The central question is whether the majority party is willing to punish "pivotal" defectors-that is, dissidents who constitute a majority if they unite with the minority party (1994, 223). Cox and McCubbins observe that punishing pivotal defectors carries the risk that the party will lose its majority status permanently, but they argue that the party will nevertheless credibly threaten punishment to dissidents because a reputation for toughness is essential to the party's organizational viability. The way to build a reputation for toughness is to use a range of punishments: "if nonpivotal groups are punished, possibly with sanctions less severe than expulsion, then members of a prospective dissident group will be concerned with the group's unity of purpose and pivotalness" (1994, 224) . This suggests that defectors on important rules votes will not necessarily be expelled, but that defection on such votes should have adverse consequences for some members. These consequences should be visible to other members-otherwise, the party will not create the reputation for toughness that is required for an effective deterrent.
Testing the claim that party leaders are able to use a range of sanctions to make the threat of punishment credible even to potentially pivotal groups is difficult; there is no ideal method to determine the number of members deterred from defecting by the threat of punishment. We focus on one particular type of punishment here: seniority violations. We do so because seniority violations are the most visible form of punishment, short of expelling members from the party (which has not been done since the 1924 case discussed below). For Cox and McCubbins' hypothesis to be testable, there must be observable punishments that are predicted to be used under specifiable conditions. Cox and McCubbins' (1994) essay suggests that some form of punishment is predicted to be meted out to at least some of the defectors on a given rule vote on a key structural matter undergirding the party's logrolling abilities. This prediction is challenged if it turns out that the most visible form of punishment-seniority violations-was not used to punish disloyalty on important rules votes for several decades.
We assess the likelihood of visible punishment in the event of various forms of disloyal behavior by majority party members: opposition to the party's presidential candidate, opposition to the party on the election of the Speaker, and defection on the vote to adopt the House rules at the opening of each new Congress.23 In Table 3 , we list the number of members engaging in each of these activities for each Congress from 1919 to 1993 in which defections occurred, along with whether these activities were followed by any loss of committee assignments or committee seniority. This does not fully respond to the problem of members being deterred from defecting due to the anticipation of punishment. The table indicates, however, the conditions un23For the period up through 1944, we relied on Berdahl (1949) for our list of presidential election defectors. For the 1948 election, we relied upon Garson (1974) , Key (1962) , and Bolling (1968). For information on subsequent presidential elections, we relied primarily upon CQAlmanac and CQ Weekly Report. We believe our list covers a substantial majority of cases of defections in presidential elections by majority party members. der which members are likely to be punished, which in turn should inform member expectations of punishment. If members see that defectors in presidential elections have often been punished, while many members have defected on rules votes without apparent sanctions, this will presumably shape members' beliefs about what the party expects of them.
Sanctions
The aftermaths of the 1922 and 1924 elections provide an interesting test for the conditions under which the majority party credibly threatens to punish dissidents. As noted above, progressive Republicans held the balance of power following the 1922 elections, and refused to back the Republican candidate for Speaker on the first several ballots in December 1923. The insurgents also allied with the Democrats to force through several important rules changes in January 1924. Yet we find no evidence that these insurgents were punished for their behavior during the Congress in question. Indeed, insurgent leader John Nelson (R-WI) was placed on the Rules Committee. Fear of losing their majority status forced Republican leaders to make concessions to the insurgents within their ranks, rather than sanctioning these members. This inability to punish dissidents in a closely divided House is evidence that the credibility of the threat to punish is seriously reduced in the case of potentially pivotal defectors.
In 1925 (Rohde 1991, 53) . This suggests that the emergence of a credible threat to sanction defectors (after its absence for many decades)-though rooted in rising Democratic homogeneity and in the large majorities of the mid-1970s-had an independent impact on partisan procedural control. Majority party members apparently were relatively free to disobey the party on even the most important procedural matters up through the mid-1970s, until the party finally made members subject to seniority violations for their conduct in the House. This change resulted in a dramatic increase in party procedural control, and likely created incentives for member loyalty on other, substantive issues as well.
Our evidence on the credibility of party threats to sanction defectors is indirect and thus should be interpreted with caution. It is possible that even before the 1970s, the majority party had access to sanctions which perhaps were less visible than seniority violations, yet were sufficient to deter a large proportion of would-be defectors. This interpretation is suspect because the majority party did lose several important rules votes during this period. Still, our evidence is sufficient only to call into question, not refute, Cox To begin to answer this question, we examine the likelihood of receiving a favorable committee assignment for Democrats in the 79th Congress (1945-46) in the aftermath of Rankin's successful amendment to create HUAC. We selected this case because the vote to create HUAC was one of the clearest tests of party loyalty on a committee jurisdiction matter in the twentieth century. The previously existing Dies Select Committee on UnAmerican Activities had a record for successfully undermining the reputation and electoral success of liberal Democrats (Goodman 1968) . As a result, voting to create HUAC was an action likely to lead to direct electoral harm to fellow Democrats. Table 4 presents our results. Based on Galloway (1946, 54, 90), we classify 10 committees as major House committees. We then examine the likelihood of receiving an assignment to one of these 10 committees, given a yes or no vote on the Rankin amendment. The first notable result is that members already on the 10 committees (none of whom were removed from the committees in the aftermath of the vote), voted 65 to 37 against the Rankin amendment.27 The rate of defections of these members (36%) is slightly higher than the 28% defection rate for party members not on the 10 major committees, although the difference is not statistically significant (p = .26). If one restricts the analysis to the Rules, Appropriations, and Ways and Means committees, the disparity is a bit stronger: members already on these committees voted 20 to 15 against the Rankin amendment, a lower proportion than that for the rest of the party, which voted 129 to 55 against Rankin (p =.19). These results most likely are traceable to disproportionate southern representation on leading House committees, but they also indicate that members serving on key committees were hardly paragons of loyalty on rules votes.
One hundred seventeen Democrats voting on the Rankin amendment were not on any of the 10 major committees at the opening of the 79th Congress. These members voted 84 to 33 against the Rankin amendment. We find that 34.5% of the members voting against Rankin received an assignment on one of the top 10 committees, while 27.3% of the members voting in favor of Rankin received such an assignment.28 Although this difference is small and is far from statistical significance (p = .59), there is some evidence to suggest that the desire to receive favorable committee assignments played some role in the vote. Freshmen Democrats, who presumably had the most to gain or lose by their conduct, voted 51 to 5 against the Rankin amendment. Region and ideology undoubtedly were in part responsible for this strong leadership support: only 16% of freshmen Democrats who voted were from the South. But even controlling for region, freshmen voted against the Rankin amendment in greater numbers than did non-freshmen.29 It seems fair to conclude that the desire for rewards from the leadership was at least a mild incentive for party loyalty on this vote. Nonetheless, the extent of this incentive is open to question: after all, three of the five freshmen who voted for Rankin received assignments to a major committee (as opposed to 19 of the 51 who were opposed). Our analysis of the 1945 case is subject to the problem that the decision to defect might depend on whether a member is seeking to transfer to a new committee. Still, our data provide some support for the view that there is an asymmetry between party leaders' ability to reward loyal behavior and leaders' ability to punish disloyal behavior (Sinclair 1983) . A likely explanation for this is that party leaders need to balance the goal of enforcing unity with "keeping peace in the family" (Sinclair 1983 ). Withholding,rewards from dissidents poses much less of a threat to "peace in the family" than does direct punishment. But the threat of withholding possible rewards apparently was not nearly as strong a deterrent to defection on critical votes as has been the post-1975 additional threat of specific sanctions. Our 1945 data indicate that the effect on future advancement of defecting on this particular key rule vote was far from overwhelming. The successes of cross-party coalitions in 1924, 1945, 1951, and 1967 speak to the limited effectiveness of the mere threat of reduced prospects for future advancement.
We conclude that the party threat to punish dissidents has varied significantly in scope and severity. The 1923 and 1925 evidence indicates that members who defect on the election of officers such as the Speaker are subject to punishment, but that leaders have been reluctant to jeopardize partisan control of the House in order to enforce strict discipline on these matters. Members who defect on rules votes have only rarely been subject to direct punishment. The threat of sanctions for various forms of disloyalty, however, appears to have increased significantly since 1975, contributing more than likely to the dramatic rise in party loyalty on rules-adoption votes. By contrast, members who defected to support the opposing party's presidential candidate have long been subject to visible punishment. This set of The Democrats' troubles in the 103rd Congress, along with the evidence on rules changes and committee jurisdictions presented above, reveals that the House majority party has not consistently been able to entrench a set of partisan logrolls in House rules. Instead, partisan control of House organization is ordinarily contested by ideological cross-party coalitions that vary in strength with the size of the majority party and its homogeneity, and by bipartisan distributive coalitions that appear to be something of a constant in Congressional politics. This complexity goes against the view that there is any coherent principle of Congressional organization that "solves" the cycling problem. It also points the way for models of legislative politics in 
